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§1. From Metaethics to the Neuroscience of Decision
 
For those of us who worry about moral philosophy’s empirical commitments in the age of science it is perhaps encouraging that there is now at least one problem with deep roots in analytic ethics that is receiving much empirical treatment from philosophers.​[1]​  That is the problem of explaining moral motivation (hereafter “MM”), or the apparent tendency of an agent to be motivated by her moral judgments, that particular class of mental states generally understood as an attitude of assent to normative claims.
The problem of MM encompasses (at least) two distinct though related philosophical disputes.  Motivational internalists (or just “internalists” for our purposes here) argue that moral beliefs motivate necessarily while externalists deny this.  And proponents of the so-called Humean theory of motivation (Humeanism) argue that moral beliefs are insufficient for motivating agents, since motivation requires in addition to a belief the presence of a conative state such as a desire.  Anti-Humeans reject the Humean theory on the grounds that moral beliefs are themselves sufficient for motivation.  Many endorse internalism or one of a few related ideas such as that moral beliefs are simultaneously desire-like (“besires”​[2]​) or that moral beliefs co-occur with or otherwise trigger the relevant desires.  A growing number of naturalistically minded philosophers are turning to data from psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science, and neuroscience to help resolve these longstanding philosophical disputes about MM.  
For example, Roskies (2003, 2006) argues that patients suffering from damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) serve as counterexamples to internalism.​[3]​  Kennett (2002; Kennett & Fine 2009) argues that clinical research with autistic persons and psychopaths favors the Kantian account of motivation, a form of anti-Humeanism according to which moral judgments are necessarily motivating.  Prinz (2006) also uses data on psychopathology, though to argue for a Humean sentimentalist account of moral concepts according to which an agent’s believing an action morally wrong amounts to her having a sentiment of disapprobation toward it.
These philosophers are, I think, right to recognize the limits of traditional philosophical methods like conceptual analysis, intuition, and armchair reflection for elucidating the mechanisms of MM.  They tacitly endorse the rather plausible idea that scientific data can catalyze progress on what is increasingly agreed to be (at least in part) an empirical question.   
But there is another assumption at work in each of these approaches that is, I think, considerably less plausible.  It is the assumption that scientific research will ultimately preserve the framework of commonsense psychology in which disputes about MM are couched.  At the heart of that framework is an explicit commitment to realism about folk psychological (FP) concepts like belief and desire.  Humeans, anti-Humeans, internalists and externalists alike are in dispute about the role that these states play in brining about MM.  Each of these views presupposes that the right (or best) account of the relationship between moral judgments and motivation will preserve beliefs and desires (or something near enough).  Eliminativism, instrumentalism, and skepticism about FP states are neither forms of anti-Humeanism nor externalism.​[4]​     
But, for reasons I will suggest presently, we have more and more reason to doubt that such intentional states do, will, or could feature into our best scientific accounts of the mechanisms of judgment and motivation – at least in the particular capacity that the vindication of FP realism requires.  Existing lines of research in cellular and social neuroscience are already converging toward an account of the causal mechanisms of moral cognition and motivation which neither invokes commonsense FP states nor appears likely to lend itself to accurate redescription in FP terms.

§2. Neuroeconomics:  The Emerging Neuroscience of Decision

The last decade has seen the development of an influential research program, “neuroeconomics,” which weds behavioral economics with experimental neuroscience.  Its key insight is to use well-vetted theories from behavioral economics to contextualize neural data generated by subjects engaged in tasks of judgment and decision.  Somewhat simplistically, behavioral economists can look to neuroscience to reveal the physiological constraints on real agents that sometimes lead them to violate the axioms of normative economic models, while neuroscientists can look to economic theory to help develop algorithmic models of decision-making.  I will suggest that—insofar as we accept the idea that moral judgments are decisions about what it is right, or best, to do under such-and-such circumstances—the data emerging from this new discipline are likely to cast doubt on the tenability of philosophical theories of MM.​[5]​
Two once-independent lines of research are now converging on a model of human moral and social decision.  Neuroscientists engaged in neuroeconomics continue to produce data which supports a two-stage mechanism for decision-making in our neural architecture while social and cognitive neuroscientists continue to show that the same neural networks and regions implicated in that two-stage mechanism are implicated in a subject’s making judgments or decisions about moral and social norms.
The two stages in the two-stage mechanism for decision-making are valuation and choice.  In valuation, subjects assign subjective values (SVs) to individual goods or actions in a range of options.  At the behavioral level, SVs can be understood as economic values calculated by quantifying the subject’s choices relative to the alternatives.​[6]​  At the neural level, it turns out that these SVs can be defined as the mean firing rates in action potentials per second of specific populations of neurons.  These neural SVs are learned, represented, stored, and ultimately used to guide motor systems.  In the second stage, choice, this neural information concerning the most highly valued item or action is implemented into motor pathways to guide physical action.
The neural process is thus very much like the process postulated by behavioral economists whose traditional models of economic choice explain decision making “as if” it involves choosing a highly-valued option from among an array of options represented in common currency (the “common currency hypothesis”).  Neurophysiological data now indicates that decision-making at the neural level does indeed seem to involve common currency.  That currency is SV:  the responses of particular populations of cells, quantifiable in real numbers whose units are action potentials per second, to each of the items or actions available.  
The neural pathways and regions implicated in valuation are the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and striatum, while those implicated in choice are the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex (Kable & Glimcher 2009).  Recordings from cells in the VMPFC have contributed to the localization of valuation.  Researchers have identified three types of neurons which respond to the values of individual goods on offer regardless of whether they are chosen (offer value neurons), to the values of goods and actions actually chosen (chosen value neurons), and to the chosen action itself (choice neurons; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006, 2008).  Similarly, these three types of neurons have been found in the caudate and putamen of the striatum where research indicates they track the values of actions (rather than goods; Samejima et al. 2005).  What is perhaps most remarkable about these results is that offer value signals in these neurons correspond precisely to the common currency postulated by most “as if” models in economic decision theory.
Research on the neural architecture for the second stage, choice, has so far implicated the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex.  Much of this research is based upon work with the visuo-saccadic control system in the primate brain.  Neuroscientists interested in sensory-motor control have studied this system extensively.  It appears to provide the mechanism by which information concerning the chosen option, and not the unchosen options, is implemented in motor systems downstream from the valuation circuitry.  Hence the explicit link with motivation.  
The details are complex, but briefly the idea is that neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), frontal eye fields (FEF), and superior colliculus (SC) form a network for visuo-saccadic decision-making.  Studies with monkeys on saccadic decision-making tasks have repeatedly shown that the firing rates of neurons in LIP and FEF increase as evidence accumulates that a visual response will result in reward.  Interestingly, once those firing rates cross a threshold, a saccade is initiated (Shadlen & Newsome 2001).  Further research has since indicated that this firing rate threshold represents a value threshold for movement selection:  the saccade is initiated when its value reaches the preset threshold (Roitman & Shadlen 2002).
Much is now known about the mechanism through which SVs—the currency for choice—are learned and represented in the primate brain.  Dopaminergic (DA) neurons in the midbrain encode a reward-prediction error (RPE), i.e., the difference between the outcome of an action actually experienced and the predicted outcome of the action (Schultz et al. 1997).  Research indicates that the firing rates of these DA neurons are linearly related to RPE as calculated by behavioral-level economic models (Bayer & Glimcher 2005).
As these lines of research elucidate the mechanisms behind choice in the primate brain, social and cognitive neuroscientists are revealing that the same regions, most notably the striatum and VMPFC are consistently implicated in tasks in which subjects are asked to make moral and social judgments (e.g., Greene & Haidt 2002; Moll et al. 2002; Koenigs et al. 2007).  While much work remains to be done, it is perhaps fair to say that direct links between moral judgment and decision-making and the neurophysiology of decision and motivation have now been established.  
We must recognize that these results, so long as they continue to withstand scientific scrutiny, already have serious implications for philosophers interested in vindicating traditional philosophical theories of MM.  These philosophers must either finally put paid to the task of locating traditional FP concepts like belief and desire in our going scientific explanations for motivational processes (call this the “location project”), or they must content themselves with formulating theories in commonsense terms (i.e., speaking from within the perspective of moral agency rather than about it, cf. Blackburn 1998) and jettison appeals to scientific data and claims about empirical respectability.  But philosophers who appeal to the sciences to support philosophical theories of MM have already conceded this latter project.  It is they who owe some plausible account of how FP states might plausibly “supervene” on the neurophysiology.


§3. Locating Beliefs and Desires:  Two Challenges for FP Realism

	The central feature of valuation is the theoretical construct of subjective value (SV) and the mechanisms through which SVs are learned.  In general terms, the trouble for the location projecct stems from a tension between the cognitive-level FP story about an agent’s subjectively valuing an item or action and the neurophysiological mechanisms upon which that story must supervene.  In more specific terms, the problem for the FP realist is that (1) SVs “exist” – they are genuine neural entities, and (2) their contribution to decision and motivation processes—i.e., their explanatorily relevant characteristics and functions—pertain uniquely to the biophysical level.  Here are those two points summarized by the leading neuroeconomist, Paul Glimcher:
1.	   “There is nearly universal agreement among neurobiologists that a group of neural systems for valuation has been identified” (2009: 511-12); and

2.	   There is a large body of data which supports the hypothesis that “learning mechanisms distributed through the basal ganglia and frontal cortex contribute to the construction of what we refer to as subjective value.  These areas are hypothesized to learn subjective values, at a biophysical level, through the well-studied process of synaptic plasticity” (519).

We have just briefly reviewed some of that data in the previous section.  I want to conclude by outlining what I take to be two of the most pressing challenges that this data appears to pose for the FP realist’s location project.

3.1. The Challenge of Causal Relevance
	The first challenge for the location project is to get beliefs and desires, whether construed as functional roles (e.g. Canberra Plan), sentences in the head (e.g. Fodor), metaphorical “directions of fit” (e.g. Anscombe 1957 and her many followers), etc., to supervene on the immediate causes of choice selection, namely the specific cellular and molecular configurations that result from synaptic plasticity in dopamine pathways and which make possible measurements of SV, without jeopardizing their causal relevance in the second stage—choice—which is directly related to motor implementation.
	There are several options in any choice context.  What the data from neuroeconomics shows if anything is that making a choice is a matter of selecting from among a set of actions or items—each of which has a SV quantifiable in neural terms—a highly valued item and implementing information concerning that option in motor pathways.  For the FP realist this process of selection must involve a set of beliefs and desires about the options on offer.  The trouble is that if beliefs and desires are instantiated in this account at all then they must be instantiated in such a way as to represent the features of each of the items or actions on offer and without jeopardizing the role of beliefs and desires in the kinds of explanations for MM that Humeans, internalists, and their opposition are offering.​[7]​ 
	Prima facie, the most plausible way for the FP realist to locate FP states in the neural account is to insist that desires are identical to or somehow constituted by SVs (or, again, the cellular/molecular configurations that make their measurement possible).  On this account of location, for any given context of choice with more than one option the FP realist will have to claim that choice involves selecting from among competing levels of desire.  A monkey faced with the choice of grapes, bananas and raisins is essentially faced with the task of selecting from among competing desires for each of the fruits, and perhaps chooses on the basis of beliefs about the quantities available.  Two grapes, the monkey believes, satisfy its desires better than one raisin.  Dopamine, synaptic plasticity, learning and so on are merely the neurophysiological mechanisms upon which the cognitive events supervene.
	Crucially, though, this approach to location will jeopardize the explanatory relevance of beliefs and desires in the traditional disputes about MM.  For example, Humeans claim that moral beliefs are insufficient for motivation because they require the presence of a desire (or similar conative state) to motivate.  Anti-Humeans deny this, generally because they are drawn to some kind of motivational internalism.  On the account of location just given, the Humean theory (or better, the spirit of that theory) will be true only trivially and its opposition simply a nonstarter.  It is true in a manner of speaking that desires are required for motivation, but the point is trivial because desires are present to varying degrees in each of the options, including those that are ultimately bypassed.  Moral beliefs about the nature of the possible options are insufficient for motivation because all such beliefs in the context of choice are insufficient for motivation.  It is a platitude that desire (so understood) must be present for motivation precisely because in any real choice it is always present in its making a contribution to SV.  
	Neither does this result serve as evidence for internalist forms of anti-Humeanism which postulate “besires,” i.e. states which are simultaneously belief-like and desire-like, since in any given decision each of the unchosen options will be motivationally inert despite each being the object of our besires (as it were). 
	The rapid proliferation of FP states in any attempt at location—which results from our having a rather hazy commonsense conception of precisely what kinds of entities they are and consequently no principled or reliable method for picking out their realizers—prevents them from contributing anything of value to explanations of MM couched in causal language. For when we gloss these complex neurophysiological processes in commonsense FP terms we end up abstracting too far away from the mechanisms most immediately relevant to the explanation.  Given the mechanisms of valuation, the claim that an agent chooses a particular (moral) course of action because she desires to is really just vacuous.​[8]​
3.2. The Challenge of Belief-Desire Directionality
	I have just suggested that on the most obvious account of location, desires are identical to or somehow constituted by SVs.  Now consider the role of beliefs on this same account.  The FP realist can perhaps say that the monkey believes that each of its options carries a specific value in terms of its desirability.  But that seems to conflate belief and desire in the traditional philosophical sense of the terms.  Beliefs, philosophers tell us, are about objective states of affairs or facts, not representations of facts about our subjective experiences of desire.
	More importantly, though, when we locate FP states in this way the interesting question is no longer whether desire must be present in addition to belief in order for choice and motivation to occur—which is the question contested by Humeans and anti-Humeans—but rather just the opposite:  how beliefs about the desirability of an action or item contribute to selection.  
	To see this, consider first that it is a consequence of the MM framework and Humeanism in particular that we must find some role for belief as well as desire in the neural explanation.  Finding neural correlates for desire at the cost of preserving any role for belief in a neural explanation for MM is hardly a victory for FP realism.  But while it seems clear enough that for the FP realist desires must somehow be closely connected to SV, it is far less clear what role remains for belief, except perhaps to say that agents have beliefs about their subjective desires (SVs).  This, though, yields the peculiar result that an agent navigates the world using representational desires and that her course of action is ultimately determined by the presence of a scale-tipping belief about which is the optimal desire to satisfy.  That is, this particular account of location might find some room for both belief and desire only by turning the dispute about Humeanism in the wrong direction.

§4. Some Preliminary Conclusions
SVs, the neural common currency for choice selection, are unlikely to deliver the supervenience base that the traditional philosophical account of desire requires.  It is difficult to see how the FP realist could provide an account according to which SVs constitute or realize desires without also realizing—entirely or in part—beliefs.  SVs are neural representations of facts about the physical constitution of the world.  Yet they are also neural representations of the facts about how that world, the physical environment, impacts the physical states of agent S’s nervous system in particular.  These complex neural representations are for this reason unlikely to admit of accurate description in the crude vocabulary of FP.
Are there alternative ways that the FP realist might locate commonsense states in this neural model of decision-making that could preserve causal relevance and directionality and ultimately vindicate commonsense theories of MM?  It is, most will argue, far too early to rule out the possibility entirely.  Even so, the emerging model of decision and motivation sketched here appears poised to deliver explanations of MM which differ from commonsense FP theories not merely in degree but in kind.  The time is ripe to begin rethinking the commonsense psychological framework upon which contemporarily analytic ethics is built.
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^1	 The last decade or so has seen a growing number of philosophers express concern over the proliferation of dubious empirical claims and assumptions in ethics. Darwall et al. observe in their overview of the last century of work in ethics that, “too many moral philosophers… have been content to invent their psychology or anthropology from scratch” (1997: 34-5).  Doris and Stich have recently echoed that concern, arguing that philosophy’s empirical complacency has discouraged scientists from “undertaking philosophically informed research on ethical issues” (2005: 115).
^2	  The term is due to Altham (1986).
^3	  More recently Roskies has argued, with Schroeder and Nichols, that instrumentalism—a variation on the Humean theory, which holds that an agent is motivated when she forms beliefs about how to satisfy her pre-existing desires—“fits well with the neuroscientific picture” of motivational processes (2010: 106).  Instrumentalism is similarly situated in the FP tradition.
^4	  Eliminativism is not a form of anti-Humean because the latter theory holds not just that beliefs are insufficient for motivation—a claim which might seem compatible with the nonexistence of FP states—but also that motivation requires the presence of a desire (or related FP state). Eliminativism is not a form of externalism because it seems there is not much sense in the eliminativist’s taking a specific position on the effects of undergoing nonexistent states.  Stich has made a similar point in response to Dennett’s instrumentalism, arguing, for example, that only real entities and not useful fictions can have causes and effects (1983: 244).
^5	  I think that this assumption is plausible for a variety of reasons.  For example, note the cost at which the FP realist rejects it:  any uncontroversial instance of an agent’s making a moral decision (rather than a moral judgment) must be treated as irrelevant to disputes about moral judgment and hence to MM.  This seems much less palatable than accepting the idea that making moral judgments is a lot like making decisions in moral contexts.  There are many such reasons to grant the assumption, though for the sake of brevity I leave them for another time.
^6	  For example, if a monkey chooses reward A (e.g., apple slice) when paired with one 1B (e.g., one raisin), 2B (e.g., two raisins), and 3B, it is indifferent at a ratio of 4B:1A, and it chooses B when 6B and 10B are offered, then the value of 1A is roughly equal to the value of 4B [i.e.: V(1A)=V(4.1B)] and hence has a subjective value of approximately 4.
^7	  The point appears to be something of a neuroscience analog for some recent objections to the possibility of formulating a so-called “belief-desire law” which some functionalists suppose capable of explaining the relationship between intentional states in the theory-theory.  Such a law might claim, for example, that “people do what they believe will satisfy their desires.”  In a notable objection, Gauker (2005) argues that there are no such laws.  First he criticizes the “simple formulation” of the belief-desire law according to which people do what they believe will satisfy their desires by pointing out that “there is never just one thing people desire; they always desire a lot of things.  They cannot do everything they think will satisfy all of their desires, because they cannot do all of those things at once” (126).  This data suggests that it is not just a platitude that people desire lots of things and cannot do them all, but that it is a fact about our neural architecture that even if we could locate some scientific analog for desire, say as part of SV, its ubiquity in the context of choice would render it explanatorily inert anyway. 
^8	  That is, at least, barring the development of an account of desire fine-grained enough to permit us to pick out only certain constituent components of SV rather than SVs themselves.   But such fine-grained accounts of desire are not likely to be forthcoming for good reason.  The more fine-grained the account becomes, the fewer commonsense cases of desiring it is likely to cover.  FP realists are sensitive to this problem.  Jackson and Pettit (1990) explain that the difficulty is to provide an explication of FP states that is specific enough to capture our commonsense attributions yet vague enough to render refutation by neuroscience unlikely.  The challenges presented in this section are intended to illustrate why achieving this golden mean is likely impossible.
